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I. Introduction

When Donald Trump became President, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had four judicial vacancies
that the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) identified
as “judicial emergencies.”1 The court also faces a larger caseload
than all the other regional circuits, and has frequently decided
appeals the least swiftly.2 The 2016 election returns indicate that
more confirmations will be necessary due to additional court
members’ probable retirement or assumption of senior status
during President Trump’s administration. Striking politicization
could frustrate this effort, however. Soon after the inauguration,
President Trump signed a novel executive order proscribing U.S.
immigration travel from seven predominantly Muslim nations—
which the court of appeals subsequently blocked—leading
President Trump to criticize the tribunal as chaotic and the
motions panel opinion and the judges who decided the case as “so
political.”3 Because the Ninth Circuit resolves the greatest
number of filings, and often does so more slowly than other
regional circuits even when the tribunal is at full capacity, the
compelling need for the President and the Senate to fill these four
open positions deserves scrutiny.
This essay initially canvasses the appellate vacancy
conundrum’s rise and continued growth. The essay then
descriptively and critically evaluates selection throughout
President Barack Obama’s administration while reviewing the
Ninth Circuit’s present situation. Ascertaining that the dilemma
resulted partly from limited cooperation between Democrats and
1. See
Judicial
Emergencies,
U.S.
COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/judicialemergencies (last updated Mar. 28, 2017) (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (showing
the current federal judicial vacancies which are classified as judicial
emergencies and defining the term judicial emergency) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See Matt Ford, Arizona v. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/a-circuitsplit/435567/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (describing how the Ninth Circuit’s
magnitude contributes to a “voluminous caseload” and “abysmal turnaround
time”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. Trump Travel Ban: President Attacks ‘So Political’ Courts, BBC (Feb. 8,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38902574 (last visited Apr. 19,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Republicans and the fortuity that multiple Ninth Circuit jurists
chose to assume senior status near the end of President Obama’s
tenure, Part III assesses major implications of the vacancy crisis.
This section finds that GOP obstruction distinctly exacerbated
the rampant partisanship, strident divisiveness, and incessant
paybacks that have clearly eviscerated judicial appointments,
phenomena which President Trump could intensify, as
exemplified by his corrosive rhetoric directed at judges in the
Ninth Circuit and the federal bench more generally. Because
those complications restrict the delivery of justice while harming
entities and individuals engaged in federal court litigation, the
final section proffers suggestions for President Trump and the
upper chamber to speedily address the Ninth Circuit openings.
II. Contemporary Selection Problems
The history of the current vacancy crisis merits limited
examination here, as it has been chronicled elsewhere 4 and
conditions now are most relevant. One notion is the persistent
vacancies conundrum, which actually derived from expanded
federal court jurisdiction, lawsuits, and judgeships.5 More salient
is the contemporary difficulty, which is political and resulted
from conflicting presidential and Senate control that began over
three decades ago.
A. Persistent Vacancies
Congress amply enhanced federal court jurisdiction in the
1960s,6 criminalizing substantially more behavior and
4. See generally Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An
Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319
(1994); MILLER CTR., IMPROVING THE PROCESS FOR APPOINTING FEDERAL JUDGES
(1996) [hereinafter MILLER REPORT].
5. The persistent vacancies conundrum needs less review; some delay in
the selection process is inherent, resists easy solution, and has received
analysis. See Comm. on Fed. Courts, Remedying the Permanent Vacancy
Problem in the Federal Judiciary, 42 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 374, 381–82 (1987).
See generally Bermant et al., supra note 4.
6. MILLER REPORT, supra note 4, at 3; see Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari
and a National Study of the Federal Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264,
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recognizing numerous civil actions, factors which enlarged
district court filings and concomitant appeals.7 Lawmakers
countered the rises by increasing judgeships.8 During the fifteen
years after 1980, confirmation periods mounted.9 For example,
appeals court nominations devoured twelve months and
confirmations three months, and both grew significantly during
that time.10 The circumstances profoundly worsened later; for
instance, appellate nominations consumed twenty months while
approvals reached six in 1997, the first year of President Bill
Clinton’s last term, and 2001, the earliest year of President
George W. Bush’s opening term.11
The process’s numerous, convoluted stages and participants
make some delay intrinsic.12 Presidents consult home state
politicians, seeking guidance on prospects. Some officials employ
panels that screen applicants while recommending capable
aspirants. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) performs
intensive “background checks.” The American Bar Association
(ABA) scrutinizes and ranks choices.13 The Department of Justice
1268–70 (1996) (observing how Congress passed numerous statutes expanding
federal court jurisdiction).
7. E.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796; Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2012); see S.1385, 113th Cong. (2013) (providing a
judgeships bill which directed the President, with the “advice and consent of the
Senate,” to appoint additional judges in certain circuits and districts); Archive of
Judicial Vacancies: Year 2016, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/judgesjudgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2016 (last visited Apr.
19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)
9. U.S. JUDICIAL CONF., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 103
(1995).
10. Id. at 3; see Bermant et al., supra note 4, at 323 (stating 1970–1992
appellate vacancy rates doubled).
11. E.g., Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars, 39 U. RICH. L.
REV. 871, 904–08 (2004); Orrin Hatch, The Constitution as the Playbook for
Judicial Selection, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1035, 1038 (2009). Both the
Clinton and Bush years resembled Obama’s initial and last two years.
12. Bermant et al., supra note 4; Sheldon Goldman, Obama and the
Federal Judiciary, 7 FORUM 9–11 (2009).
13. MILLER REPORT, supra note 4; see ABA STANDING COMM. ON FEDERAL
JUDICIARY, WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS (1983); see also infra note 88
(evaluating the Trump Administration decision to eschew pre-nomination ABA
evaluations and rankings).
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(DOJ) may help review aspirants while preparing nominees for
Senate evaluation. The Judiciary Committee analyzes picks,
conducts hearings, discusses submissions, and votes; those
reported might have final debates, when needed, prior to floor
ballots.
B. The Modern Concern
Most critical now is rampant partisanship which essentially
drives selection.14 This was propelled after U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit Judge Robert Bork’s
attempted Supreme Court appointment, ushering in modern
confirmations which are characterized by politicization,
divisiveness, and systematic paybacks.15 However, strident
partisanship soared across Obama’s presidency when the GOP
engaged in unprecedented obstruction.16
Tardy nominations might explain the relatively few
confirmations. In early 1997 and 2001, President Clinton and
President George W. Bush marshaled rather small numbers of
circuit picks, some of whom opponents criticized.17 Politicians
who afforded suggestions concomitantly delayed the pace.18
14. Article II suggests that senators may constrict unwise administration
choices, while politics has infused appointments. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 513
(Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961). See generally MICHAEL GERHARDT,
THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (2000) (analyzing the evolution of judicial
appointments which culminated in unprecedented processing delays); SHELDON
GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT
THROUGH REAGAN (1997) (reviewing selection under nine Presidents and finding
that partisanship was a critical driver of the problems with the federal
appointments process).
15. See generally, e.g., MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE (1992);
JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 18 (2007). For the previous history, see GOLDMAN,
supra note 14, at 205; DAVID O’BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE 20 (1988).
16. See infra notes 33–58 and accompanying text (assessing the systematic
Republican obstruction in recent years).
17. Press Release, White House, Office of Press Sec’y, President Clinton
Nominates 22 to the Federal Bench (Jan. 7, 1997); George W. Bush: Remarks
Announcing Nominations for the Federal Judiciary, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(May 9, 2001), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=45595 (last
visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. Republicans mandated input, even tendering names. Neil Lewis,
Clinton Has Chance to Shape Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/09/us/clinton-has-a-chance-to-shape-the-
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President Bush’s lack of consultation restricted selection,19 while
limited analysis of President Clinton’s aspirants explicated
paybacks.20 The committee had considerable responsibility, as it
slowly evaluated, conducted hearings, and voted on persons.21
Over 1997 and 2001, however, few selections nominated captured
appointment due to resource constraints and politics, specifically
ideological differences.22 Related pressing Senate business and
unanimous consent, which permitted one member to halt ballots,
stopped plentiful final votes.23

courts.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); see 143 CONG. REC. 4254 (Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden)
[hereinafter Biden statement].
19. David L. Greene, Bush Sends Judge List to Senate, BALT. SUN (May 10,
2001), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2001-05-10/news/0105100112_1_senatedemocrats-appeals-court-confirmation-process (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see Elliot Slotnick, Appellate
Judicial Selection During the Bush Administration: Business as Usual or a
Nuclear Winter?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 225, 234 (2006) (“From the Democrats’
perspective, meaningful consultation was absent . . . .”).
20. Paul Gigot, How Feinstein is Repaying Bush on Judges, WALL ST. J.
(May 9, 2001), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB989369905566856183 (last
visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Neil
Lewis, Party Leaders Clash Over Pace of Filling Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES (May
10, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/10/us/party-leaders-clash-in-capitolover-pace-of-filling-judgeships.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. See Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton
Administration, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 741, 742 (1997) (explaining how there
was one hearing for appellate court nominees each month when the Senate was
in session); Biden statement, supra note 18 (contending that there were two
hearings every month in 1987–1994).
22. See generally Tobias, supra note 21; Neil Lewis, Bush and Democrats
Trade
Blame
on
Judges,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
4,
2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/04/us/bush-and-democrats-in-senate-tradeblame-for-judge-shortage.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
23. Jennifer Bendery, Republicans Still Find Ways to Stall Judicial
Nominees Despite Filibuster Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/08/republicans-judicialnominees_n_4748528.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).

THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL VACANCY CRISIS

693

C. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit manifested both attributes of the national
conundrum. For example, huge population rises instigated by
economic growth and mounting immigration expanded district
court matters and corresponding appeals; thus, court seats
increased, reaching twenty-eight by 1984.24 Accelerating
politicization concomitantly subverted the process by delaying
many approvals.25 However, certain elements ameliorated Ninth
Circuit selection problems. For instance, across most of the
tribunal’s 126-year existence, it experienced no vacancy crisis.
Appellate membership was comparatively small and court
openings arose infrequently, while the chamber rather easily
filled most. Indeed, until 1968, the appeals court operated with
merely nine jurists.
Even though a judgeships bill which Congress mustered over
1978 authorized ten seats, President Jimmy Carter realized
considerable success when appointing jurists, partly because
Democrats controlled the Senate, which meant there was no
unfilled judgeship when President Ronald Reagan became chief
executive.26 President Reagan’s administration smoothly
confirmed jurists—although legislation did create five positions—
as the GOP enjoyed a chamber majority in President Reagan’s
first six years, but once Democrats recaptured the body they
astutely collaborated.27 Senator Joe Biden (D-Del.), who ably
chaired the Judiciary panel, attempted to confirm all strong,
24. Judgeship acts expanding posts manifest these ideas. E.g., Pub. L. No.
95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978); Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 345 (1984). The
privacy needs of candidates, senators, and Presidents can frustrate efforts to
paint a comprehensive picture.
25. See supra notes 17–23 (observing that the politicization was gradual,
worsening after the Supreme Court confirmation process for Judge Bork).
However, even later, some cooperation happened. Infra notes 27–29; see also
generally CHARLES GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE
FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2007).
26. Archive of Judicial Vacancies: Year 1981, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicialvacancies/1981 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); see GOLDMAN, supra note 14, at 236–84 (comprehensively
describing selection during the Carter years).
27. Biden statement, supra note 18; see GOLDMAN, supra note 14, at 285–
345 (comprehensively describing selection during the Reagan years).).
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consensus picks, and the chamber approved High Court Justice
Anthony Kennedy with six appellate jurists in 1988, but there
were multiple Ninth Circuit vacancies at that year’s end.28
Felicitous processing continued throughout much of President
George H.W. Bush’s tenure, albeit slowing in 1992, which left one
court of appeals post empty.29
President Clinton filled this open seat in part because
Democrats enjoyed a Senate majority across his first few years.
Nevertheless, the GOP earned control starting in 1995, which
frustrated appointments efforts, while the chamber did not
approve more jurists until early 1996. Over various times in the
ensuing years, vacancies reached ten of twenty-eight judgeships,
including three upon the presidency’s close, which exacerbated
delayed appeals’ resolution.30 That situation improved during
President George W. Bush’s tenure, especially when Republicans
possessed a Senate majority. The President confirmed numerous
appointees mainly by consulting Democrats, although controversy
arose, leaving one Ninth Circuit vacancy upon his
administration’s conclusion.31
In short, appointments were recently mixed, but a few
periods did yield relatively successful confirmation endeavors.
Illustrative were the George H.W. and George W. Bush
28. Judge Bork’s confirmation process was an exception to relatively
collegial
selection.
Archive
of
Judicial
Vacancies,
U.S.
COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicialvacancies (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing vacancy information for years
1988–1989 and showing three vacancies) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
29. Senator Biden cooperated with President Bush. Archive of Judicial
Vacancies: Year 1993, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/judgesjudgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/1993 (last visited Apr.
19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
30. President Clinton’s predisposition to name able centrists and
compromise together with some GOP senators’ coordination allowed processes in
certain states to operate rather well. Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note
28 (providing vacancy information for years 1995–2001).
31. Archive of Judicial Vacancies: Year 2009, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicialvacancies/2009 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). When Judge Stephen Trott, whose chambers were located in
Idaho, assumed senior status, California senators argued that his seat belonged
to their state—a dispute that continued for a decade. Todd Ruger, Senate Vote
Ends Feud Over Ninth Circuit Seat, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 31, 2014.
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presidencies, even though the situation gradually worsened after
Judge Bork’s notorious confirmation fight until 2009, when it
deteriorated.32
III. Obama Administration Selection
The process worked rather effectively in President Obama’s
first term and a half when Democrats enjoyed a chamber
majority. He avidly consulted in-state officers, especially
Republicans, pursuing, and normally following, suggestions of
talented, mainstream, diverse nominees.33 These initiatives
promoted collaboration, as lawmakers from jurisdictions having
vacancies receive deference because they could halt the process
through retaining “blue slips.”34 Even with aggressive
presidential cultivation, many did not cooperate, failing to
suggest able people.35
The GOP coordinated with regular hearings yet “held over”
discussions and committee votes seven days for all but one in
sixty-plus exceptional, moderate circuit aspirants.36 Republicans
32. See supra notes 16, 25, 29 (providing examples of relatively successful
confirmation endeavors in the George H.W. and George W. Bush presidencies
and deterioration in Obama’s presidency); see also GEYH, supra note 25.
33. Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2233, 2239–40, 2253 (2013); see Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama’s
First Term Judiciary, 97 JUDICATURE 7, 8–17 (2013) (describing President
Obama’s commitment to expanding diversity on the federal courts, so that the
judiciary would better reflect the U.S. and describing the process in the Obama
Administration).
34. Ryan Owens et al., Ideology, Qualifications, and Court Obstruction of
Federal Court Nominations, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 347, 347; Tobias, supra note 33,
at 2242.
35. Some politicians sent relatively few or none. See Goldman et al., supra
note 33, at 17; John Cornyn and Ted Cruz’s Texas: A State of Judicial
Emergency, ALLIANCE FOR JUST., http://www.afj.org/our-work/issues/judicialselection/texas-epicenter-of-the-judicial-vacancy-crisis (last updated Sept. 6,
2016) (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (“The list of Texas vacancies continues to grow,
in part, because Cornyn and Cruz have refused to screen candidates for district
court judgeships . . . until a seat becomes vacant and the court is already
working without its full allotment of judges.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); 161 CONG. REC. S6151 (daily ed. July 30, 2015) (statement of
Sen. Schumer).
36. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Mar. 22, 2013); Tobias, supra
note 33, at 2242–43.
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slowly concurred on numerous picks’ final debates, when
required, and up or down ballots, relegating strong centrists to
languish for weeks until Democrats asked for cloture.37 The GOP
also pursued substantial roll call votes and plentiful debate time
for competent, mainstream aspirants, who readily captured
approval, thereby devouring scarce chamber floor hours.38 Those
procedures roiled appointments, leaving twenty court of appeals
openings, some that plagued the Ninth Circuit, for almost a
half-decade following September 2009.39
In the 2012 presidential election year, these Republican
strategies grew.40 Delay persisted, while court of appeals chamber
ballots actually ended in June. With President Obama’s
reelection, Democrats hoped for greater cooperation, which failed
to materialize, and resistance skyrocketed the next year when he
forwarded three excellent, moderate, diverse prospects for the
D.C. Circuit, the nation’s second most important tribunal.41 The
GOP would not accord the choices floor votes, while prolonged
recalcitrance motivated Democrats’ explosion of the “nuclear
option” that restricted filibusters.42 This allowed the Ninth
Circuit to lack vacancies at 2014’s close.
During 2015, when Republicans had secured a majority,43
already negligible collaboration further declined. GOP leaders
37. I rely in this paragraph on Goldman et al., supra note 33, at 26–29;
Tobias, supra note 33, at 2243–46.
38. Tobias, supra note 33, at 2244; see Juan Williams, The GOP’s Judicial
Logjam, HILL (July 27, 2015), http://thehill.com/opinion/juan-williams/249196juan-williams-the-gops-judicial-logjam (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
39. Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 28 (providing vacancy
information for years 2009–2014).
40. Tobias, supra note 33, at 2246.
41. I rely, in this paragraph’s remainder, on Carl Tobias, Filling the D.C.
Circuit Vacancies, 91 IND. L. J. 121 (2015); Jeffrey Toobin, The Obama Brief,
NEW YORKER, Oct. 27, 2014, at 24.
42. The 113th Senate approved 130 judges. Archive of Judicial Vacancies,
supra note 28 (providing vacancy information for years 2013–2014). Republicans
forced Democrats to file cloture on all pre-2015 nominees, especially after
Democrats unleashed the nuclear option. 161 CONG. REC. S3223 (daily ed. May
21, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy) [hereinafter Leahy statement].
43. Jerry Markon et al., Republicans Win Senate Control, WASH. POST,
Nov. 4, 2014; Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, GOP Takes Senate, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2014, at A1.
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incessantly promised that they would again bring to the chamber
“regular order,” the approach which governed before Democrats
ostensibly eroded it. Early in January, Senator Mitch McConnell
(R-Ky.), the new Majority Leader, exclaimed: “We need to return
to regular order.”44 Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), who
became the Judiciary Committee Chair, vowed that he would
analogously evaluate submissions.45 Despite manifold pledges,
Republicans slowly provided individuals for President Obama to
consider, nominee hearings, committee ballots, chamber debates,
and final votes. Upon 2015’s conclusion, this meant that eight of
nine appellate vacancies lacking nominees—which the U.S.
Courts identified as emergencies—troubled states that GOP
members represented.46 Politicians confirmed one appeals court
jurist last year and a second in 2016.
On November 12, 2014, President Obama proposed Kara
Farnandez Stoll, an experienced, mainstream counsel, and
District Judge Felipe Restrepo, a distinguished, consensus jurist,
as Federal Circuit and Third Circuit nominees.47 Stoll’s March
2015 hearing proceeded smoothly;48 the nominee had a late April
panel ballot.49 In June, Senator McConnell suggested that circuit
possibilities’ approvals would cease.50 Senator Harry Reid (D44. He repeatedly recites the regular order mantra. 161 CONG. REC. S27
(daily ed. Jan. 7, 2015); id. at S2767 (daily ed. May 12, 2015). But see id. at
S2949 (daily ed. May 18, 2015) (statement of Sen. Reid); Leahy statement, supra
note 42.
45. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Jan. 21, 2015); David
Catanese, Chuck Grassley’s Gavel Year, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 28,
2015), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/01/28/chuck-grassleys-gavelyear (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
46. Republicans minimally cooperated with the administration, which
prompted Obama to select no 2015 appellate court pick and nominate seven in
2016; none won approval. Emergencies reflect docket size and vacancy length.
Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 28 (providing vacancy information for
years 2015–16).
47. Press Release, White House, Office of Press Sec’y, President Obama
Nominates 2 to U.S. Court of Appeals (Nov. 12, 2014).
48. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Mar. 11, 2015).
49. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Apr. 23, 2015).
50. McConnell never did clarify precisely what his suggestion meant. Nick
Gass, McConnell Vows to Slow Nominees, POLITICO (June 5, 2015),
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/mitch-mcconnell-judicial-nominations118674 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
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Nev.), the Minority Leader, next excoriated McConnell for
abdication of his constitutional duty by scheduling no final
action.51 Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the Ranking Member,
correspondingly decried the failure to appoint in weeks a
nominee, especially Stoll, which might have provoked her
significant July 95–0 vote.52
Judge Restrepo’s canvass was painfully slow. The
accomplished centrist waited 200 days on a hearing, because
Senator Pat Toomey (R-Pa.) retained the blue slip until May
2015, as compared with Senator Bob Casey (D-Pa.), who delivered
his in November 2014.53 A June hearing progressed successfully;
Senator Toomey proffered support and Judge Restrepo expertly
fielded questions propounded.54 The Senate only confirmed him in
January 2016.55
Review). But see Alex Bolton, McConnell Backs Away from Shutdown, HILL
(June 6, 2015), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/244196-mcconnell-backsaway-from-judicial-shutdown-talk (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (denying that
there would be a Republican shutdown on President Obama’s federal court
nominees despite McConnell’s previous comments) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
51. Senator Reid contended that McConnell would “not even [approve] a
consensus nominee [like] Stoll,” recounting the Kentucky senator’s floor pleas
for rapidly approving Bush 2008 appellate choices. 161 CONG. REC. S3849-50
(daily ed. June 8, 2015).
52. Id. at S4591 (daily ed. June 24, 2015); id. at S4678 (daily ed. July 7,
2015).
53. Jonathan Tamari, A Judicial Nominee Waits; Toomey Is Blamed,
PHILA. INQUIRER (May 8, 2015), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/local/2015050
8_A_judicial_nominee_waits__Toomey_gets_blamed.html (last visited Apr. 19,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But see Pat Toomey, I
Am Not Delaying Judge L. Felipe Restrepo’s 3rd Circuit Nomination,
PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE
(May
13,
2015),
http://www.postgazette.com/opinion/letters/2015/05/13/I-am-not-delaying-Judge-L-FelipeRestrepo-s-3rd-Circuitnomination/stories/201505130068?pgpageversion=pgevoke (last visited Apr. 19,
2017) (“I fully support the president’s proposal to elevate Judge Restrepo to the
3rd Circuit, just as I supported his confirmation to the federal district court.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
54. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Judicial Nominees (June 10, 2015). He
was held over but unanimously voice voted. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business
Mtgs. (June 25, July 9, 2015).
55. No plausible reason justified Judge Restrepo’s protracted confirmation
for an emergency opening. 162 CONG. REC. S21 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 2016); supra
text accompanying notes 48–49, 52 (contrasting Judge Restrepo’s delayed
process to Judge Stoll’s fast approval).
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This was a presidential election year, when appointments
conventionally slow and halt, factors distinctly intensified by
GOP refusal to process U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Chief Judge Merrick Garland, President Obama’s experienced,
mainstream High Court nominee.56 Even though customs do
allow fine, moderate circuit nominees to receive votes after May,
that failed to happen this past year.57 Confirming a sole appellate
pick for 2015 with a second in January 2016 was nearly
unprecedented: in 2007–2008, the Democratic majority helped
confirm ten of President George W. Bush’s prospects and, in 1988,
six choices whom President Reagan denominated and High Court
Justice Anthony Kennedy.58 The figures portended ominously for
2016’s remainder, while GOP senators did not accelerate the pace
to match confirmations secured during President Bush’s final
pair of years.
IV. Reasons for and Implications of Problematic Selection
The explanations for selection’s problematic state are
complex,59 yet observers ascribe the “confirmation wars” to Judge
56. Russell Wheeler, The ‘Thurmond Rule’ and Other Advice and Consent
Myths,
BROOKINGS
INST.
(May
25,
2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/05/25/the-thurmond-rule-and-otheradvice-and-consent-myths/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2017last visited Apr. 19, 2017)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Michael Shear et al., Obama
Pick Opens Court Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2016, at A1.
57. Carl Tobias, Confirming Circuit Judges in a Presidential Election Year,
84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 160, 169 (2016); see also sources cited supra
note 56. Delaying Judge Garland slowed these nominees. 162 CONG. REC. S1523
(daily ed. Mar. 16, 2016); S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtgs. (Mar. 17,
May 19, 2016) (statements of Sens. Leahy & Grassley).
58. Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 28 (providing vacancy
information for years 1988, 2007–2008); Christopher Kang, Republican
Obstruction of Courts Could Be the Worst Since 1800s, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr.
20,
2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/christopher-kang/republicanobstruction-of_b_9741446.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (observing that 20152016 circuit appointments could have been the fewest since 1897–1898 when the
federal courts comprised only twenty-five circuit judgeships) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
59. Professors and lawmakers have long debated whether judicial selection
has always been as controversial as today. See generally Michael Gerhardt &
Michael Ashley Stein, The Politics of Early Justice, 100 IOWA L. REV. 551 (2014);
Orrin Hatch, The Constitution as Playbook for Judicial Selection, 32 HARV. J. L.

700

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 687 (2017)

Bork’s appointment process.60 They detect that the regime has
collapsed, as manifested through corrosive partisanship, systemic
paybacks, and stunning divisiveness wherein both parties
constantly ratchet up the stakes, plainly shown by persistent
denial of Supreme Court nominee Merrick Garland’s analysis.61
The consequences are bleak. The radical inaction since 2015
means that the judiciary has twenty circuit, and forty-nine
emergency, openings.62 The courts of appeals could only have the
“few” vacant posts after Democrats marshaled the nuclear option
that constricted filibusters.63 Recent inactivity, however,
multiplied open seats and emergencies by 2017, four involving
the Ninth Circuit, partly because two judges assumed senior
status upon last year’s end.64
Delayed court approvals have critical adverse impacts.65
They make nominees leave careers on hold and prevent many
& PUB. POL’Y 1035 (2009).
60. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text (describing GOP
obstruction).
61. The latest began with claims that Democrats stalled during President
Bush’s last two years and Republicans retaliated with unprecedented delay in
President Obama’s time. Democrats then detonated the nuclear option to swiftly
confirm many judges in 2014. The GOP next drastically slowed all nominees and
detonated the nuclear option for Supreme Court nominees. See supra text
accompanying notes 31, 33–58 (describing obstruction throughout Obama’s
presidency which resulted in unprecedented numbers of vacancies over a
protracted time); Matt Flegenheimer, Republicans Gut Filibuster Rule to Lift
Gorsuch, Apr. 7, 2017, at A1.
62. The latter skyrocketed from twelve to forty-nine. Archive of Judicial
Vacancies: Year 2017, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/judgesjudgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2017 (last visited Apr.
19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see Wheeler, supra
note 56 (describing the Thurmond Rule); Joe Palazzolo, Obama’s Successor Will
Likely Fill Dozens of Judicial Vacancies, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 18, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/obamas-successor-will-likely-fill-dozens-of-judicialvacancies-1458340351 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (“The winner of the 2016
presidential election will likely come into an early opportunity to make an
immediate impact on the federal bench . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
63. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text (explaining the
Democrats’ detonation of the nuclear option to expeditiously move nominees
through the confirmation process).
64. They were Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain and Judge William Clifton.
Archive of Judicial Vacancies: Year 2017, supra note 62.
65. Tobias, supra note 33, at 2253; Leahy statement, supra note 42.
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talented candidates from envisioning the bench.66 Interminable
reviews deprive tribunals of necessary judicial resources and
myriad litigants of justice.67 These detrimental effects also
undermine citizen regard for the selection procedures and the
government branches.68 Few circuits address challenges so
daunting as the Ninth, which confronts the greatest appeals that
consume the most protracted time.69
In sum, this analysis reveals the degraded nature of the
circuit appointments process, which President Trump’s signals
might compound, and the need for prompt action. First, the
Senate has a constitutional duty. Major precedent, which
supports appellate confirmations generally and even near a
presidency’s end, must apply.70 Replacing Justice Scalia
seemingly delayed work on the Ninth Circuit vacancies. Limited
cooperation between Republicans and Democrats when
addressing the Court opening should have meant that the
senators had plentiful time for approving Ninth Circuit judges,
and had both parties collaborated to appoint a Justice, especially
in 2016, they might easily confirm four Ninth Circuit aspirants
this year.71 If the parties are able to coordinate in scrutinizing
66. Andrew Cohen, In Pennsylvania, the Human Costs of Confirmation
Delays,
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
9,
2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/po
litics/archive/2012/09/in-pennsylvania-the-human-costs-of-judicial-confirmationdelays/261862/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Palazzolo, supra note 62.
67. JOHN ROBERTS, YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7–8
(2010); Tobias, supra note 33, at 2253; Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges are
Burned Out, Overworked and Wondering Where Congress Is, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/judge-federal-courtsvacancies_us_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
68. Tobias, supra note 33, at 2253.
69. TABLE B-4D—U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS JUDICIAL BUSINESS (Sept. 30,
2016),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b4d_0930.201
6.pdf. Senior judges have been invaluable to Ninth Circuit efforts to resolve
substantial caseloads, but a number of these jurists died or retired in the last
decade. Carol J. Williams, Judges’ Deaths Add to 9th Circuit Backlog, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/15/local/la-me-9thcircuit-vacancies-20111012 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 57–58 (observing that
confirmations are easier to attain at a presidency’s beginning than end).
71. Mike DeBonis, 100 Days Later, White House Isn’t Giving Up on
Replacing
Antonin
Scalia,
WASH.
POST,
(May
25,
2016)
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able, mainstream court of appeals nominees who resemble a
multitude felicitously canvassed and elevated in prior years, they
can efficaciously approve jurists.72 Finally, the tribunal needs a
full judicial complement to speedily, inexpensively, and equitably
conclude the largest appeals.73
V. Suggestions for Filling the Vacancies
A. General Ideas
1. The Nomination Process
President Trump’s first priority has been creating a
government. Insofar as time has existed for work on court
appointments, considerable initiative was devoted to the
Supreme Court endeavor.74 The President afforded comments
about the type of judges he might nominate when campaigning,
but the ideas may have been election-year rhetoric or directed at
the High Court instead of the appellate courts.75 President Trump
lacks experience with selection as compared to President George
W. Bush, who had approved plentiful state court jurists when
Texas’ Governor, and President Obama, who labored on
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/05/25/a-hundreddays-later-white-house-isnt-giving-up-on-replacing-antoninscalia/?utm_term=.3d1325a6e50f (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). For example, in the 1988 presidential
election year, the Senate approved Justice Kennedy and six circuit picks. Supra
notes 28, 58, 70.
72. For elevation of judges from district to appellate courts, see Tobias,
supra note 33, at 2258; infra notes 89–92.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 24–25, 69 (describing the enormous
Ninth Circuit docket and the substantial backlog of cases).
74. Press Release, White House, Office of Press Sec’y, President Trump
Nominates Judge Neil Gorsuch to Supreme Court (Jan. 31, 2017); see Adam
Liptak, Gorsuch Clinched Spot After a Lengthy Process, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
2017, at A15 (discussing Judge Gorsuch’s nomination process).
75. Shane Goldmacher et al., How Trump Got to Yes on Gorsuch, POLITICO
(Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/trump-supreme-courtgorsuch-234474 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Liptak, supra note 74; see Press Release, White House, Office of
Press Sec’y, Doing What He Said He Would Do: President Trump’s Transparent,
Principled and Consistent Process for Choosing a Supreme Court Nominee (Jan.
31, 2017).
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confirmations when he served as a member of the U.S. Senate.76
The new President’s limited familiarity with judges and courts
generally and selection particularly might explain his comments
and specific White House perspectives. In fairness, however, the
current administration remains nascent with many complex
assignments to complete, although a number of conclusions may
be derived from early actions.77
The recent Supreme Court nomination process affords
certain insights about circuit appointments.78 The measures for
designating a nominee appeared comparatively effective and the
result secured was concomitantly defensible, given time
restraints and other crucial White House demands. Assessors
might criticize as inappropriate outsourcing the chief executive’s
putative reliance on the Federalist Society and the Heritage
Foundation in compiling the list of twenty-one aspirants from
whom the chief executive tapped, yet President George W. Bush
applied comparable practices.79
Very little information exists on appellate selection in part
because the Supreme Court vacancy preoccupied numerous
salient participants;; the White House and Justice Department,
which have chief responsibility, fulfilled other monumental
76. E.g., Carl Tobias, Filling the Texas Federal Court Vacancies, 95 TEX. L.
REV. __ (manuscript at 5) (forthcoming 2017) (“Each Bush named many state
court judges.”) (on file with author); Gregory Korte, With The Tables Turned,
Obama Now ‘Regrets’ His 2006 Alito Filibuster, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2016),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/02/17/obama-now-regrets-his2006-alito-filibuster-white-house-says/80514152/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
77. The presidency is too new and not enough hard data exist to posit
definitive conclusions. Trump has proposed merely one circuit nomination and
has yet to proffer more appellate nominations, even though the Senate has
completed its consideration of Justice Gorsuch. Comparatively few home state
officials have apparently recommended picks, and the White House, the Justice
Department, and senators have said little publicly about the circuit processes
which they are deploying.
78. I rely here and in this paragraph’s remainder on sources cited supra
notes 74–75, infra note 87.
79. Jeffrey Toobin, The Conservative Pipeline to the Supreme Court, NEW
YORKER, Apr. 17, 2017, at 24; Jason DeParle, Debating the Subtle Sway of the
Federalist
Society,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
1,
2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/politics/politicsspecial1/debating-the-subtlesway-of-the-federalist.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see infra note 87.
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duties;; and home state politicians were helping create a new
government and may have been waiting on the executive. Some
ideas can be extracted from recent Texas appellate vacancy
initiatives.80 Exceptionally conservative ideological views are the
principal characteristic which unites the six people President
Trump supposedly asked the Texas Judicial Evaluation
Commission to investigate.
A few early White House actions inspire nominal confidence.
President Trump’s derogatory, misguided public statements
regarding jurists, tribunals, and court opinions, as well as certain
legal arguments enunciated by the Justice Department, have
been problematic. For example, when Judge James Robart
decided to impose a temporary restraining order upon the U.S.
travel ban, which President Trump considered wrong, he
denigrated the respected jurist as a “so-called judge.”81 Prior and
subsequent to the Ninth Circuit panel’s affirmation of the district
court order, President Trump explicitly remarked that the jurists
and their determinations were “so political.”82 He later
80. I rely here and below on John Council, 6 Candidates Trump Wants to
Place on the Fifth Circuit Set for Vetting, TEX. LAWYER (Feb. 14, 2017),
http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202779124278/6-Candidates-Trump-Wants-toPlace-on-the-Fifth-Circuit-Set-for-Vetting?slreturn=20170229154845
(last
visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Ken
Klukowski, Texas Republicans Hail Judicial Hopefuls to Fulfill Trump Promise,
BREITBART
(Feb.
23,
2017),
http://www.breitbart.com/biggovernment/2017/02/23/exclusive-texas-republicans-hail-judicial-hopefuls-fulfilltrump-promise/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). See generally Tobias, supra note 76 (discussing the federal court
vacancies in Texas).
81. David Cole, ‘So-Called Judges’ Trump Trump, WASH. POST (Feb. 10,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.comopinions/so-called-judges-trumptrump/2017/02/10/573fd1c8-ef42-11e6-b4ff-ac2cf509efe5_story.html?utm_term=
.1386627acf03 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Court Pick Says Trump’s Critique of
Judiciary is ‘Demoralizing’, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2017, at A1. But see Jonathan
Turley, Trump’s Abuse of Judges is Perfectly Presidential, USA TODAY (Feb. 23,
2017), http://www.usatoday.com
/story/opinion/2017/02/23/so-called-judge-robart-trump-twitter-judges-jonathanturley-column/97824926/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (“[President Trump’s
statement] was not only relatively mild for Trump but positively tame in
comparison with past conflicts between Presidents and judges.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
82. Robert Barnes, Trump Suggests Only Politics Could Lead Court to
Rule Against His Immigration Order, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2017),
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mistakenly castigated the appeals court by alleging “that circuit
[is] frankly in turmoil,” and the federal government had to react
expeditiously “because of the bad decision we received from a
circuit that has been overturned at a record number,” dismissive
retorts which might dramatically reignite counterproductive
activities to split the Ninth Circuit.83 The Justice Department
made the remarkable assertion that federal judges could not
directly review the President’s authority to issue the executive
order governing immigration, a contention which the appellate
court distinctly rejected.84
These actions suggest President Trump may confront
somewhat greater difficulty approving jurists than other new
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-their-courtroomstheyre-protected-by-people-like-me-dhs-secretary-weighs-in-on-legal-disputeover-trump-ban/2017/02/07/5e37fc4e-ed4e-11e6-96626eedf1627882_story.html?utm_term=.a5180967d8f3 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see Sai Prakash & John Yoo,
Trump’s ‘So-Called’ Judgment, WALL STREET J., Feb. 13, 2017, at A15; infra note
130 (detailing President Trump’s criticism of Judge Gonzalo Curiel that
presaged the recent attacks).
83. Full Transcript and Video: Trump News Conference, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/politics/donald-trump-pressconference-transcript.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see Bob Egelko, Trump May Reopen Debate
on Splitting Ninth Circuit in SF, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON. (Feb. 18, 2017),
http://www.sfgate.com/nation/article/Trump-attack-may-reopen-debate-on-splitti
ng-Ninth-10943304.php (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). For the most recent attack, see Press Release, White
House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement on Sanctuary Cities Ruling (Apr. 25,
2017). Even were his data accurate, they mean little, as the Supreme Court
hears so few cases. Adam Feldman, Evaluating Speculation That the Ninth
Circuit is the Lower Court SCOTUS Overturns the Most, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS
(Feb. 27, 2017), https://empiricalscotus.com/2017/02/27/evaluating-speculationninth-circuit/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). The circuit is also very efficient and transparent. Egelko, supra;
see also Ariane de Vogue, Trump Considering Proposals to Break up the 9th
Circuit,
CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/26/politics/9th-circuit-what-toknow/index.html (last updated Apr. 26, 2017) (last visited Apr. 30, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Peter Baker, Defiant Trump Vows
to Take Immigration Case to Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/us/politics/trump-immigration-courtscalifornia.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 30, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
84. Order at 13–18, Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 9,
2017); see Cole, supra note 81; Adam Liptak, Justice Dept. Drops Travel Ban
Case, But Says a New Order is Coming, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2017, at A16.
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Presidents, but he can easily ameliorate the situation. Because
creating the government and filling the Court vacancy have
demanded much time, the White House needs to identify
essential
appointments
priorities.
For
instance,
the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts categorizes open slots as
emergencies based on conservative work and case load
projections, which show vacancies warranting priority.85
President Trump also ought to keep in mind that re-nominating
and confirming several able, consensus Obama nominees who
almost captured approval, especially District Judge Lucy Koh,
will actually preserve scarce resources, which must be dedicated
to restarting the process, cultivate Democrats, and quickly fill the
Ninth Circuit openings.86
The Federalist Society and the Heritage Foundation
correspondingly appeared to help Mr. Trump compile the list of
twenty-one aspirants from whom the candidate pledged to
nominate a Supreme Court pick, and they will continue supplying
advice on circuit vacancies.87 Most Presidents seek ideas and
candidates from public servants who had previous selection
responsibilities and conventional outlets, notably myriad
particular lawyers, the ABA, and concomitant state and local
bars.88 Administrations correspondingly pursue efficacious input
85. Judicial Emergency Definition, supra note 1.
86. E.g., Carl Tobias, Confirm Judge Koh for the Ninth Circuit, 73 WASH.
& LEE. L. REV. ONLINE 449 (2016); see sources cited supra note 57 (describing the
difficulty in confirming judges during presidential election years); infra notes
126-127 (discussing Koh’s nomination and confirmation processes).
87. See sources cited supra notes 74–75, 79 (addressing President Trump’s
process for nominee selection); see also Jeffrey Toobin, The Supreme Court After
Scalia, NEW YORKER (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com
/magazine/2016/10/03/in-the-balance (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (detailing
Justice Scalia’s impact on the Supreme Court and the potential ramifications)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Kyle Peterson, Trump’s
Supreme
Court
Whisperer,
WALL
STREET
J.
(Feb.
3,
2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-supreme-court-whisperer-1486165573 (last
visited Apr. 19, 2017) (explaining the decisions made behind the scenes that led
to Judge Gorsuch’s selection) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Eric Lipton & Jeremy Peters, Conservatives Press Overhaul in the
Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2017, at A1 (describing the Federalist Society’s
influence generally on Republican Presidents’ judicial selections and on Justice
Neil Gorsuch’s nomination).
88. Goldman et al., supra note 33, at 19–20; Tobias, supra note 33, at
2239–40. Unfortunately, President Trump eschewed ABA input through
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from less traditional sources, namely ethnic minority, female,
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals and entities.
The White House can and ought to carefully approach those
persons and committees.
President Trump should also contemplate notions which
proved salutary for prior administrations. One is elevating
current federal and state court judges, particularly federal
district jurists and state High Court Justices.89 That avenue is
constructive, as the chamber has already canvassed and
confirmed federal judges, who have much pertinent expertise and
comprehensive, fine, accessible records.90 This scrutiny decidedly
facilitates primary constituents of Senate assessments, notably
ABA consideration, candidate ratings, and FBI background
checks. Plentiful state justices’ work directly resembles that of
federal appeals court jurists.91 Other possible sources would be
attorneys involved with federal circuit and district cases.92
evaluations and ratings prior to nominations. This decision is a mistake,
because the ABA assessments and ratings are very professional, afford valuable
insights, and can save the candidates and the administration from
embarrassment, should problematic revelations arise subsequently in the
process. Mike Zubrensky, Trump, Lower Court Nominees Need American Bar
Association Review, THE HILL (Apr. 25, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/punditsblog/the-judiciary/330414-trump-lower-court-nominees-need-non-partisan-ameri
can-bar (last visited Apr. 30, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). The administration may also want to remember that the ABA accorded
Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Samuel Alito and Gorsuch its
highest rating. Adam Liptak, White House Cuts ABA Out of Judge Evaluations,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2017, at A16.
89. See generally Elisha C. Savchak et al., Taking it to the Next Level: The
Elevation of District Court Judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 50 AM. J. OF
POL. SCI. 478 (2006); Tobias, supra note 33, at 2243–46.
90. See, e.g., Press Release, White House, Office of Press Sec’y, President
Obama Nominates Judge Mary Murguia to the U.S. Court of Appeals (Mar. 25,
2010); id., President Obama Nominates Judge Jacqueline Nguyen to the U.S.
Court of Appeals (Sept. 22, 2011); 156 CONG. REC. S10,986 (daily ed. Dec. 22,
2010) (regarding the Murguia confirmation); 158 CONG. REC. S1677 (daily ed.
May, 14, 2012) (regarding the Nguyen confirmation).
91. See, e.g., Press Release, White House, Office of Press Sec’y, President
Obama Nominates Justice Morgan Christen to the U.S. Court of Appeals (May
18, 2011); Press Release, White House, Office of Press Sec’y, President Obama
Nominates Justice Andrew Hurwitz to the U.S. Court of Appeals (Nov. 2, 2011);
157 CONG. REC. S8625 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2011) (regarding Judge Christen’s
confirmation); 158 CONG. REC. S4108 (daily ed. June 12, 2012) (regarding Judge
Hurwitz’s confirmation).
92. See, e.g., Press Release, White House, Office of Press Sec’y, President
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Modern chief executives have located responsibility for
appellate confirmations and nominations in the White House
Counsel Office with help, mainly when preparing specific
nominees for the appointments process, supplemented by the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Policy (OLP).93 President
Trump must grant tribunal selection considerable priority and
allocate sufficient resources to clearly expedite nominations and
confirmations by, for instance, promoting ABA and FBI canvasses
and concerted White House selection efforts.
Presidents actively consult home state politicians, seeking
proposals of a few well-qualified, mainstream choices for all
openings.94 Vigorous consultation helps in states with empty
posts, which have two senators from the party lacking White
House control—as is true for California, Hawaii, and Oregon—
because they could stop any processing through not delivering
blue slips. Each party’s leaders from home states must be
responsive to White House overtures, cooperate in good faith, and
promptly denominate several exceptional, consensus aspirants for
President Trump’s consideration by indicating preferences and
cogent reasons for them.
The administration ought to cautiously and speedily evaluate
the lawmakers’ input, present them lingering questions,
diligently reconcile substantial differences which remain, and
choose a nominee who proves satisfactory for President Trump
and the members. The White House needs to maximize
transparency consistent with privacy of all concerned and secure
the finest disposition. The politicians should pursue clear and
equitable resolution.
Obama Nominates Paul Watford to the U.S. Court of Appeals (Oct. 17, 2011);
Press Release, White House, Office of Press Sec’y, President Obama Nominates
Michelle Friedland to the U.S. Court of Appeals (Aug. 1, 2013); 158 CONG. REC.
S3388 (daily ed. May 21, 2012) (regarding Judge Watford confirmation); 160
CONG. REC. S2426 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2014) (regarding Judge Friedland’s
confirmation); see infra note 133. Other prospects may be state intermediate
appellate and trial judges and counsel, but federal court experience would be
more applicable to Ninth Circuit service.
93. See Goldman et al., supra note 33, at 14–16; Tobias, supra note 33, at
2239.
94. Presidents assume the lead. They and senators deem circuit selection
critical. Circuits encompass multiple states, are courts of last resort for ninetynine percent of cases in specific regions, and treat complex, essential issues.
Tobias, supra note 33, at 2240–41.
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President Trump concomitantly ought to inform the senators
about the possible nominee, so the politicians can express why
they deem the nominee objectionable. Recommending a few
candidates and swift, open communications will give the
President and legislators considerable flexibility and decrease
surprise. If the politicians keep opposing someone President
Trump proffers, they must attempt to effectively resolve crucial
disagreements, so all could identify a preferred approach.
Continued objection and blue slip retention often fosters
embarrassment, delay, cost, and the necessity to restart the
process, which can materialize and devour scarce resources.95
2. The Confirmation Process
Once the President nominates, Judiciary Committee
Democrats and Republicans should collaborate to insure quick,
thorough, and fair confirmation processes. The specific parties’
staffs must astutely conduct prompt, systematic, and equitable
investigation partly by helping expedite ABA and FBI
consideration, and the nominee should cooperate with these
individuals and entities by, for instance, comprehensively and
directly completing the panel questionnaire.96
Home state politicians must retain blue slips when they
actually conclude that a nominee proves unacceptable after
exhausting initiatives meant to have the chief executive alter the
nomination’s course. The touchstone should be merit, defined visà-vis remarkable independence, ethics, intelligence, diligence,
and balanced judicial temperament. The choice recommended
ought to possess, although senators need to ensure that the
95. These ideas suggest why proffering multiple candidates is usually
preferable to suggesting one.
96. President Trump’s executive nominees experienced considerable
difficulty finishing questionnaires or ethics reports, while some nominees even
withdrew. Ylan Mui & Ed O’ Keefe, Treasury Nominee Initially Omitted More
Than $100 Million from Disclosures, Democratic Memo Says, WASH. POST (Jan.
19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/01/19/treasurynominee-initially-omitted-more-than-100-million-from-disclosures-democraticmemo-shows/?utm_term=.ca33e8d5b388 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Alan Rappeport, Issues of Riches, Trip up
Picks, But Few, If Any, May Be Denied, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2017, at A1.
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candidate in fact has: (1) views within the mainstream of U.S.
jurisprudence, defined as not too ideologically conservative or
liberal; (2) abundant respect for High Court precedent and many
state and federal legislative and executive branch concerns; and
(3) no prejudgments about the critical matters to be decided.
After the lawmakers return blue slips for a nominee who
clearly possesses these attributes, the committee must speedily
arrange a hearing. When the nominee is very capable, moderate,
and not controversial, and the corresponding ABA, FBI and
committee evaluations have been thorough and fair while
yielding unproblematic conclusions, relatively few politicians
attend the hearing which often smoothly proceeds.97 If
controversy does arise, the session ought to promote robust,
complete, and equitable questioning. The hearing chair ordinarily
instructs members that they have seven days in which to tender
written queries which are normally direct, comprehensive,
rigorous, and fair, while the prospect swiftly, completely, and
cautiously answers those questions.
A few weeks later, the panel convenes an executive business
meeting in which senators comprehensively and equitably discuss
questions regarding the nominee and vote. If the committee
approves the choice, but the minority party filibusters, the
nominee’s advocates should pursue cloture, which accomplished,
mainstream nominees ordinarily capture.98 After the selection
comes to the floor, the Majority Leader needs to promptly arrange
a chamber debate and ballot. McConnell should encourage
complete, robust discussion that respects the nominee, the
process, and colleagues. Following this Senate debate, legislators
rapidly vote.
At the outset, Democrats will confront, and must carefully
address, a conundrum: whether to retaliate for the unprecedented
GOP denial of any consideration to Judge Garland, party
rejection of Judge Koh’s Senate ballot, and the limited canvass
97. Third Circuit Judge Felipe Restrepo’s hearing was illustrative.
Relatively few members attended, the queries were rather perfunctory, and the
nominee easily fielded them. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Judicial Nominees
(June 10, 2015); see Carl Tobias, Confirming Judge Restrepo to the Third
Circuit, 88 TEMPLE L. REV. ONLINE 37, 43, 45–46 (2017) (emphasizing Restrepo’s
smooth hearing).
98. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 33, at 2244–46; see supra note 39.
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provided six other able, consensus appeals court nominees whom
President Obama tapped last year.99 Democrats ought to resist
that temptation at least initially, especially if President Trump’s
picks comprise excellent, moderate nominees, because matching
GOP obstruction will accelerate the process’ unproductive
downward spiral. Full collaboration with President Trump and
Republican politicians could also facilitate confirmations, and the
Ninth Circuit must have all its judges to supply justice.
Democrats ought to completely and equitably query
nominees in hearings, pose rigorous questions, and
comprehensively explore many qualifications across committee
and floor discussions. If they have serious concerns regarding
ability, ethics, or temperament, or detect that nominees retain
perspectives beyond the jurisprudential mainstream, Democrats
should ventilate criticisms, be receptive to persuasive GOP
arguments while treating the contentions and vote no on
candidates when unsatisfied.
B. Specific Vacancies
The four Ninth Circuit judges who assumed senior status
were confirmed from, and maintain chambers in, Arizona,
California, Hawaii, and Oregon. Contemporary administrations
honor the custom of nominating prospects from the states where
the openings arise.100 Presidents do so because lawmakers
jealously guard their prerogatives to sustain this remnant of
unalloyed patronage.101

99. None of the seven appellate court nominees received a floor vote and
four had no hearing. Tobias, supra note 57; sources supra note 86; infra notes
119–128.
100. For two exceptions, see Carl Tobias, Filling the Fourth Circuit
Vacancies, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2161, 2174 (2011) (filling a South Carolina seat with
a North Carolina nominee); supra note 31 (describing dispute over Judge
Stephen Trott’s seat).
101. All of the states which comprise each circuit must have at least one
active jurist. This means that a Hawaiian will replace Judge Clifton. 28 U.S.C. §
44 (c) (2012).
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1. Arizona

The White House should persistently consult Senators John
McCain (R) and Jeff Flake (R) and preferably the state’s
Democratic political leader, who need to cooperate with one
another by submitting people for President Trump’s
consideration. The administration ought to evince solicitude for
the Republican officials, because they have voiced more criticism
of White House initiatives, and exercised greater independence,
than numerous GOP members.102
The politicians should employ a few pertinent sources for
prospects, while considerable in state precedent favors nominee
elevation, as President Obama confirmed Arizona District Court
Judge Mary Murguia and Arizona Supreme Court Justice
Andrew Hurwitz to the Ninth Circuit.103 Peculiarly relevant
would be the six fine, mainstream, diverse trial level possibilities
whom both Republican lawmakers designated and were
confirmed in 2014.104 The jurists have served adequate periods to
compile easily-located records, which, in fact, supplement their
already consummate expertise. For instance, practically all had
judicial experience when confirmed. Thus, useful information
about competence, ethics, temperament, and decisionmaking
could now be readily available.
More specifically, Judge Diane Humetewa carefully worked—
over thirteen years with the U.S. Attorney Office—on questions
central to Indian Law and federal practice, which culminated
with her acclaimed confirmation to be U.S. Attorney, capably
serving
Bush
primarily
at
McCain’s
behest.105
She
102. E.g., Carl Hulse, Trump’s Next Battle: Keeping These Republicans
Happy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2016, at A20; Alan Rappeport et al., Some Senators
in GOP Feel Trump’s Wrath, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2016, at A1.
103. See supra notes 86, 89-91 and accompanying text (providing an
example of possible elevation and elevation’s benefits).
104. See generally Press Release, White House, Office of Press Sec’y,
President Obama Nominates 8 for the District Courts (Sept. 19, 2013); Carl
Tobias, Filling the District of Arizona Vacancies, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. SYLLABUS 4
(2014).
105. See sources cited supra note 104; Press Release, DOJ, Diane J.
Humetewa Sworn in as United States Attorney (Dec. 8, 2007),
https://web.archive.org/web/20080520010135/http://www.justice.gov/usao/az/pres
s_releases/2007/2007-255%20%28Humetewa%29.pdf; John McCain & Jeff
Flake, Federal Judge Diane Humetewa, 40 HUM. RIGHTS 22 (2015).
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correspondingly was the first Native American woman to hold a
federal court post; thus, Humetewa’s elevation will increase
diversity and both legislators would strongly promote her
candidacy.106 Among the 2014 confirmees, Judge Steven Logan
had been a well-regarded U.S. Magistrate Judge prior to
nomination, while Judge Alan Soto was a prominent state trial
court jurist.107
The four Arizona District judges whom President George W.
Bush confirmed upon the proposal of McCain and John Kyl (RAz.) have assembled comprehensive, accessible records with
substantial experience for a decade serving on the tribunal. Judge
Cindy Jorgenson was a respected federal prosecutor for ten years
and a state trial judge for six.108 Judge David Campbell ably
clerked at the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, practiced
many years with a strong Arizona firm, and chaired the Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.109 Judge Neil Wake had skillfully practiced over three
decades and capably administered the court as chief judge.110
106. See sources cited supra notes 104–105 (showing McCain and Flake’s
avid support for Humetewa for the district bench).
107. Dan Nowicki, Obama Nominates Santa Cruz Judge for Ariz. U.S.
District
Court,
ARIZ.
REPUB.
(Dec.
18,
2013),
http://archive.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20131219obama-nominatessanta-cruz-judge-district-court-arizona.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Alia Rau, Second Ruling in 2 Days
Against
Abortion
Laws,
ARIZ.
REPUB.
(Oct.
16,
2015),
http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/arizona/politics/2015/10/16/judge-freezesarizona-abortion-reversal-law/74079464/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); see sources cited supra note 104
(describing the 2014 district appointees).
108. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 1798–Present, FED. JUD. CTR.
(2017), http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited Apr.
19, 2017) [hereinafter Directory] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see generally Dillon Fishman, Judicial Profile: Hon. Cindy K.
Jorgenson, U.S. District Judge, District of Arizona, 63 FED. LAWYER 21 (2014).
109. Directory, supra note 108; Zoe Tillman, ‘Informed By What I Am’:
Judges Talk Obligation to Faith, Duty and the Law, LAW.com, (Sept. 30, 2016),
http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2016/09/28/informed-by-what-i-am-judgestalk-faith-duty-and-the-law/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
110. Directory, supra note 108; Chris Geidner, Arizona Enlists Major Law
Firm to Import Execution Drugs from India, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 28, 2016),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/chrismcdaniel/arizona-enlists-major-law-firm-toimport-execution-drugs-fro?utm_term=.gp8LQn9ga6#.prMye1RQZP (last visited
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Judge Murray Snow, who joined the federal bench in 2008, was a
preeminent Arizona Court of Appeals Judge for six years, while
he professionally oversaw novel litigation encompassing
controversial activities of Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio.111
Related promising outlets would be federal circuit and trial
court lawyers and the Arizona Supreme Court. For instance,
prominent Arizona Ninth Circuit Judges Mary Schroeder and
Michael Daly Hawkins constituted well-regarded practitioners at
nomination,112 while Chief Justice Scott Bales and Vice Chief
Justice John Pelander have been valuable Arizona High Court
members for numerous years.113
Once the senators do agree, they might present several
prioritized suggestions with full explanations of the potential
nominee rankings. The White House, in turn, must carefully and
expeditiously canvass those notions while selecting a person who
satisfies President Trump and the legislators. The President
should inform the officers about the prospect being considered,
which enables the senators to identify a pick they may oppose
and cogently explain why. If one does resist after frank
discussions, both should keep negotiating and reach a preferred
solution.114 When all concur, they must cooperate with each other
Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
111. Directory, supra note 108; Michael Kiefer, A Look at Arpaio’s Judge,
ARIZ. REPUB., June 6, 2015, at A6.
112. Judge Schroeder practiced with the Lewis & Roca law firm; Judge
Hawkins practiced with a few firms before and after 1977–1980 service as U.S.
Attorney. Directory, supra note 108; Jason Hoppin, Schroeder Will Lead 9th
Circuit, THE RECORDER, Aug. 15, 2000; Betsy Russell, 9th Circuit Skeptical in
Idaho Case Challenging NSA Cell Phone Surveillance, SPOKESMAN REV. (Dec. 8,
2014),
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2014/dec/08/9th-circuit-judgesskeptical-idaho-case-challengin/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
113. Howard Fischer, Newest AZ Supreme Court Justice Likens Role to
Umpire’s
Task,
TUCSON.COM
(Aug.
16,
2009),
http://tucson.com/news/national/newest-az-supreme-court-justice-likens-role-toumpire-s/article_912f0ac6-ef77-5827-8070-82f794de2d36.html (last visited Apr.
21, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jon Kamman &
Billy House, Justice O’Connor Retires, ARIZ. REPUB. (July 2, 2005),
http://archive.azcentral.com/specials/special47/articles/0702oconnor-legacy.html
(last visited Apr. 21, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
114. These measures provide flexibility while restricting embarrassment,
expense, and delay by obviating the need to restart, if President Trump differs
with a single choice tendered. Supra note 95.
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and the politicians’ colleagues to insure a swift, thorough and fair
confirmation process. Little else specific to Arizona can be
provided until the White House nominates, but the general ideas
explored would apply.115
2. California
President Trump must vigorously consult Senators Dianne
Feinstein (D) and Kamala Harris (D) and probably the state’s
leading Republican, who ought to collaborate by agreeing on a
few impressive, consensus designees for presidential analysis.
Feinstein has tendered valuable, lengthy Judiciary Committee
service, working efficaciously with GOP lawmakers, and is now
the Ranking Member.116 For example, Senator Feinstein helped
disputed Bush nominees, including Circuit Judges Brett
Kavanaugh, William Pryor, and Leslie Southwick, when they
captured panel and chamber approval, which should endear her
to opposition colleagues.117
Feinstein and Harris initially must carefully ask that the
President re-nominate District Judge Lucy Koh, who earned
February 2016 nomination on the recommendation of Feinstein
and Barbara Boxer (D). She was a dynamic, mainstream
nominee, who marshaled a bipartisan committee vote. This
possibility would also save precious, scarce time by not having to
recommence the designation process. Swiftly filling the open post
115. See supra Part IV.A.2. Critical will be swift, full, respectful, dignified,
and robust committee review and prompt, fair, and complete panel and chamber
discussions regarding nominee qualifications.
116. Michael Doyle, What’s Ahead for West’s Liberal Appeals Court, Once
Trump
Takes
Over?,
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(Nov.
23,
2016),
http://www.sacbee.com/news/article116777848.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see Bob Egelko, Feinstein,
Harris Will Have Some Pull on Federal Judge Picks, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON.
(Dec. 31, 2016), http://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/Feinstein-Harris-willhave-some-pull-on-federal-10828126.php (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
117. Bob Egelko, Feinstein Draws Fire Over Vote for Judge, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON. (Aug. 4, 2007), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Feinstein-drawsfire-over-vote-for-judge-2549435.php (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Avoiding Clash, Senate
Sends Judicial Nomination to Floor, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at A18.
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is essential for many litigants, Ninth Circuit jurists, and
California active circuit judge representation.118
President Trump must diligently assess re-nominating Judge
Koh.119 Across six years in California’s Northern District, the
jurist has enjoyed a fine reputation for astutely deciding complex
issues, especially of intellectual property, expertise the tribunal
requires. She is a district judge, which often expedites the process
as Koh’s FBI analysis merely needed updating, and because the
jurist was confirmed once she has compiled a lengthy, accessible
record.120 The committee amply investigated Koh by actively
coordinating with the FBI and the Justice Department.121
The Chair only arranged a July hearing, but Senator
Grassley ought to have reciprocated for Democrats’ collegially
approving ten circuit jurists across 2007–2008.122 Koh testified at
the session, which proceeded effectively 123 while capturing
September panel approval 13–7 with four GOP members,
including the Chair, favoring the pick.124 After July 6, the GOP
leadership failed to permit chamber votes for any of twenty-three
highly-qualified, appellate and district court consensus aspirants
118. This may appear to conflict with the proposition that senators should
offer multiple picks, as this would increase flexibility. When senators agree on a
designee, however, President Trump should defer, as they have worked on the
vacancy, are more familiar with excellent prospects who will best represent
California, and can halt processing by retaining blue slips.
119. I rely here on Tobias, supra note 86. President George W. Bush
provided critical precedent for renominating Judge Koh. The chief executive
included Roger Gregory whom President Bill Clinton had recess appointed to
the Fourth Circuit and Barrington Parker whom Clinton had nominated to the
Second Circuit in Bush’s first package of appellate nominees. Neil Lewis, Bush
Appeals for Peace on His Picks for the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001.
120. Tobias, supra note 33, at 2258; see Tobias, supra note 86, at 450–52.
121. Judge Koh had received vetting when she was nominated to the
Northern District of California, so analysis was brief. Tobias, supra note 86, at
460–61.
122. President Obama sent four appeals court nominees before, and two
after, Judge Koh. Archive of Judicial Vacancies: Year 2016, supra note 8; see
Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 28 (providing information for years
2007–2008).
123. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees, July 13, 2016 (statements
of Sens. Feinstein & Boxer). Both stressed her sterling record, GOP support, and
Ninth Circuit dire need.
124. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg., Sept. 15, 2016; see Tobias,
supra note 86, at 462.
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with committee reports, so all of these plus twenty-eight other
designees’ nominations expired in January.125
Judge Koh warranted a rapid chamber debate and ballot.
Senator McConnell should have effectuated the regular order
that the Majority Leader has insistently championed and honored
directly relevant 2008 precedent.126 Because the senator,
nevertheless, eschewed staging Judge Koh’s debate and vote, her
champions ought to have aggressively pursued cloture.127
Accomplished centrists traditionally receive up or down ballots;
therefore, legislators who appreciate custom should have quickly
agreed on cloture.128 Had the aspirant reached the floor, Senator
McConnell ought to have conducted a dignified and respectful
debate, which robustly considered numerous pertinent questions,
and the chamber must have voted. In sum, the experienced,
prominent judge attained no final ballot due to GOP obstruction
unrelated to her candidacy’s actual merits.
If President Trump wishes to consider several prospects, the
California lawmakers must attempt to realize consensus on a few
names. Additional sources would be the twenty-three California
district jurists whom President Obama recommended and
confirmed; many of the possibilities have served five years. An
example is Northern District Judge Edward Chen, who in fact
affords considerable ethnic, and impressive, rare experiential,
diversity, because he previously was a very capable ACLU
lawyer.129 Another is Southern District Judge Gonzalo Curiel,
who offers ethnic diversity and thirteen years of highlycompetent initiatives as a federal prosecutor, while his
125. 161 CONG. REC. S7183-84 (daily ed. Jan 3, 2017).
126. Tobias, supra note 86, at 454, 455 n.29 (noting McConnell’s urging
regular order and Bush nominees’ 2008 approval). Much time remained in the
114th Congress’s second session Judge Koh’s final vote, yet it did not occur.
127. Tobias, supra note 86, at 454 n.20, 463 n.73; see supra note 98; 162
CONG. REC. S5312 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2016) (discussing unanimous consent
denial).
128. See Tobias, supra note 86, at 457 nn.36–41.
129. Directory, supra note 108; see generally Edward Chen, The Judiciary,
Diversity, and Justice for All, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1109 (2003); Kenneth Lee, One
Year and Waiting—The Nomination of Edward M. Chen, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kenneth-k-lee/one-year-andwaiting-the-_b_703971.html (last updated May 25, 2011) (last visited Apr. 19,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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confirmation might help ameliorate President Trump’s
unjustified excoriation of the jurist.130
President Bush confirmed twenty-one nominees, who have
rendered fine district court service across the past ten years. For
instance, Judge James Selna had been a respected O’Melveny &
Myers partner for two decades before nomination, while he
masterfully resolved the Toyota “sticky pedals” litigation.131
Judge Philip Gutierrez could bring ethnic diversity and immense
expertise following considerable rigorous work in the Los Angeles
County Superior Court across ten years.132
A number of federal circuit and district court attorneys can
also be promising sources. For example, Obama confirmees Judge
Paul Watford and Judge Michelle Friedland were stellar civil
practitioners for numerous years in the superb Munger, Tolles &
Olson law firm, while Judge John Owens had correspondingly
been a partner and capably served with the U.S. Attorney’s Office
a number of years.133
A related valuable possibility would be the California
Supreme Court. For instance, Justice Goodwin Liu and Justice
Mariano- Florentino Cuéllar had been groundbreaking law
professors at California Berkeley and Stanford prior to California
High Court appointment.134 Nonetheless, the U.S. Senate GOP
130. Directory, supra note 108; Alan Rappeport, Judge Faulted By Trump
Has Faced a Lot Worse, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2016, at A12; Editorial, Donald
Trump and the Judge, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2016, at A20; see supra note 82.
131. Directory, supra note 108; Stuart Pfeifer, Judge Taps Lawyers in
Toyota Cases, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 2010.
132. Directory, supra note 108; Kenneth Ofgang, Judge Philip Gutierrez
Confirmed to U.S. District Court, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE (Feb. 1,
2007), http://www.metnews.com/articles/2007/guti020107.htm (last visited Apr.
19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
133. Directory, supra note 108; Scott Graham, 9 Circuit Nominees Face
Uncertain Prospects, RECORDER, Aug. 30, 2013; 160 CONG. REC. S1881 (daily ed.
Mar. 31, 2014) (regarding the Owens approval); supra note 92.
134. Bob Egelko, Goodwin Liu Confirmed to Calif. Supreme Court, SAN
FRANCISCO
CHRON.
(Aug.
31,
2011),
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Goodwin-Liu-confirmed-to-CalifSupreme-Court-2311696.php (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); David Siders, Jerry Brown Names Law
School Professor to California Supreme Court, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 22, 2014),
http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitolalert/article2604510.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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minority earlier halted Liu’s Ninth Circuit approval, because it
contended he was outside the mainstream.135
After the lawmakers concur, all need to propose multiple
selections with full explication of their prioritization for President
Trump, who, in turn, should pick a mutually satisfactory
purported nominee.136 Once the chief executive and the
Californians agree, they must deploy speedy, comprehensive, and
fair confirmation procedures. Nothing more about California
needs analysis before President Trump chooses, although
concepts proffered above should govern.137
3. Hawaii
The President ought to insistently consult Senators Mazie
Hirono (D) and Brian Schatz (D) and perhaps a high-level state
Republican politician, who necessarily must coordinate with
President Trump and each other to swiftly name competent,
moderate designees for White House review. The political leaders
should use plentiful sources for picks’ suggestion.
One illustration would be the pair of accomplished,
consensus, diverse trial level nominees Obama appointed. Judge
Leslie Kobayashi won 2010 approval, having carefully labored
over ten years as a well-respected Magistrate Judge.138 Judge
Derrick Kahala Watson has remained a district jurist since 2013
following robust work as a federal prosecutor for nearly twenty
years.139 A similar prospect could be George W. Bush Hawaii

135. Tobias, supra note 33, at 2242; Egelko, supra note 134.
136. The ideas should allow all to craft the best result and limit
embarrassment, cost, and delay by preventing the necessity to start over if
President Trump disagrees with a sole pick offered. Supra note 95.
137. See supra Part IV.A.2, B.1. Crucial is prompt, thorough, dignified, and
rigorous panel scrutiny with expedient, fair, and full committee and Senate
debates on a choice’s qualifications.
138. Directory, supra note 108; Ken Kobayashi, Dignity Key for Kobayashi,
STAR
ADVERTISER
(Feb.
18,
2017),
http://www.staradvertiser.com/2010/12/27/hawaii-news/dignity-key-forkobayashi/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
139. Directory, supra note 108. The jurist initially addressed Hawaii’s
lawsuit which challenged President Trump’s first immigration order. Order,
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District appointee Michael Seabright, who has professionally
served for twelve years, has been the chief judge and was the very
capable U.S. Attorney before that.140
A related potential source of nominees might be numerous
federal court practitioners.141 Another may be the Hawaii State
High Court. The five Justices were appointed every year from
2010 until 2014, while they comprise prominent, highly-regarded
jurists.142
The legislators should provide several impressive prioritized
submissions with thorough explanations for the administration,
which ought to choose a person who satisfies all. If one lawmaker
keeps opposing this judgment after frank discussions, everyone
ought to continue negotiation and craft a preferred result.143
President Trump and the Hawaiian lawmakers should then
insure the designee a quick, fair confirmation process. Little else
about Hawaii merits stating before the President taps a
candidate, yet the ideas above should pertain.144
Hawaii v. Trump, C.V. No. 17-00050 DKW-KJM (Feb. 9, 2017). Judge Watson
subsequently enjoined the revised travel ban. Highlights From Court Ruling
Halting Trump’s Revised Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/us/politics/highlights-immigrationruling.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 11, 2017) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); see Alexander Burns, From a Placid Judge in Honolulu, A
Cutting Rejection of Trump’s New Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2017, at
A12.
140. Directory, supra note 108; Jonathan Handel, Judge Scolds Hollywood
Sex Accuser for Lying in Court, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 21, 2014),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/judge-scolds-hollywood-sex-accuser742505 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
141. President George W. Bush drew from practice Judge Richard Clifton,
whose recent assumption of senior status created the Ninth Circuit vacancy.
Directory, supra note 108; Jason Hoppin, Judicial Profile: Richard Clifton,
RECORDER
(Sept.
24,
2002),
http://www.therecorder.com/id=900005372930/Judicial-Profile-RichardClifton?slreturn=20170229183753 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
142. Hawaii Supreme Court Justices, HAW. ST. JUDICIARY, http://
www.courts.state.hi.us/courts/ supreme/justices/justices (last visited Feb. 28,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
143. These practices offer flexibility and limit embarrassment, expense, and
delay by eliminating the need to restart if President Trump does not agree with
a lone prospect suggested. Supra note 95.
144. See supra Parts IV.A.2, B.1–2. Central is fast, respectful, and robust
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4. Oregon
President Trump needs to consult Oregon Senators Ron
Wyden (D) and Jeff Merkley (D) and possibly upper-echelon in
state GOP politicians, who necessarily should cooperate with the
President and each other to speedily proffer competent,
mainstream aspirants for Trump’s consideration. The legislators
ought to invoke a number of sources.
One would be the accomplished, consensus Obama trial level
picks, two of whom have served longer than five years. Judge
Marco Hernandez—who provides ethnic, and intensive
experiential, diversity from Oregon Legal Services practice—was
a Bush nominee the chamber failed to approve.145 Judge Michael
Simon labored for the international law firm Perkins Coie for
numerous years after being Justice Department trial counsel for
over five.146 Judge Michael McShane, who increases sexual
orientation diversity and experiential diversity from rigorous
Public Defender work, carefully and fairly treated the nascent
Oregon marriage equality litigation.147
A related source is the only nominee whom President Bush
confirmed, Judge Michael Mosman, who has prominently served
thirteen years——a number as chief judge——enjoyed
appointment to the powerful Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, and was the extremely capable U.S. Attorney prior to
committee analysis with quick, equitable, and comprehensive panel and
chamber debates regarding nominee qualifications.
145. Directory, supra note 108; see Charles Pope, Senate Unanimously
Approves Marco Hernandez to be Federal Judge, OREGONIAN (Feb. 7, 2011),
http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/02/senate_
unanimously_approves_ma.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
146. Directory, supra note 108; see Charles Pope, U.S. Senate Confirms
Portland Attorney Michael Simon as Oregon Federal Judge, OREGONIAN (June
21,
2011),
http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/06/senate_confirms_michael_s
imon.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
147. Directory, supra note 105; see generally Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F.
Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014); Jeff Mapes, Judge McShane Writes Unusually
Personal Decision in Oregon Gay Marriage Case, OREGONIAN (May 19, 2014)
http://www.oregonlive.com/mapes/index.ssf/2014/05/judge_michael_mcshane_wr
ites_u.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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joining the district.148 Another would be the federal court bar
from which President Obama appointed Simon.149 A fourth
possibility is the Oregon Supreme Court. Justice Rives Kistler
and Justice Martha Walters have compiled dynamic records
across prolonged service; he earned a clerkship with Justice
Lewis Powell and she was the initial female President of the
National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.150
The politicians should provide a few suggestions with
explications of prioritization and collaborate to make a
nomination satisfactory for President Trump and the
legislators.151 When they concur, all must work together with the
lawmakers’ colleagues to institute fast, thorough, and equitable
confirmation practices. Nothing specific to Oregon might be
added until President Trump designates the nominee, but the
propositions surveyed previously may obtain.152

148. Directory, supra note 108; see Bryan Denson, Portland Federal Judge
Appointed to Secretive Surveillance Court, OREGONIAN (June 7, 2013)
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2013/06/portland_
federal_judge_appoint.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (chronicling the
experience of Judge Mosman) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Charlie Savage, Roberts’ Picks Reshaping Surveillance Court, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 2013, at A1 (“Ten of the court’s 11 judges — all assigned by
Chief Justice Roberts — were appointed to the bench by Republican Presidents;
six once worked for the federal government.”).
149. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Michael
Simon).
150. Karen Breslau, A Rising Tide, Rocking Boats, NEWSWEEK (May 16,
2004), http://www.newsweek.com/
rising-tide-rocking-boats-128335 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Amanda Bronstad, Oregon Justice Elected
ULC President, NAT’L. L. J., Dec. 13, 2007. For full disclosure, Justice Walters is
a personal friend.
151. If one legislator keeps rejecting President Trump’s pick after candid
discussions, all ought to cooperate and pursue optimal resolution. These
procedures yield flexibility and decrease embarrassment, expense, and delay by
avoiding the necessity to start again if President Trump differs with a single
pick submitted. Supra note 95.
152. See supra Parts IV.A.2, IV.B.1–3. Critical would be quick, dignified,
and rigorous panel evaluation with fast, complete, and fair committee and
Senate debates related to prospect qualifications.
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VI. Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit resolves the most cases the least swiftly in
part because the tribunal now suffers four emergency vacancies.
If President Trump and the Senate follow the concepts posited,
they might simultaneously fill those openings with excellent
jurists who best promote justice while addressing the
counterproductive downward spiraling process, which restricts
the judiciary’s ability to deliver justice and citizen respect for the
government.

